Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that 80% of judges are trustowrthy, and 80% of lawyers are untrustworthy.

In an inquisitorial system, that means 20% of cases will bee decided essentially entirely by an untrustworthy person, who has complete control of the proceedings. What are the incentives of the judge? What can the agrieved party (by the judge) do about it?

In an adversarial system, that means I probably have an untrustworthy lawyer, but one whose incentives line up with mine. My opponent also has (most likely) an untrustworthy lawyer, but one whose incentives line up with his. There is a judge, who might not be trustorthy, but who doesn’t have full control of the proceedings – each lawyer gets their turn.

It’s not about individual trust – it’s about how oftn the system produces a just result. It’s about how well the system limits damage by bad actors.

Our system used to handle it moderately well. A loser-pays system would help steer us back to that.

An inquisitorial system handles bad actors very poorly.