<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	
	xmlns:georss="http://www.georss.org/georss"
	xmlns:geo="http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos#"
	
	>
<channel>
	<title>
	Comments on: Arbitration and &#8220;coercion&#8221;	</title>
	<atom:link href="https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/</link>
	<description>Chronicling the high cost of our legal system</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 30 May 2008 19:41:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	
	<item>
		<title>
		By: David Schwartz		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10988</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[David Schwartz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2008 06:43:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10988</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;blockquote&gt;As long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop elsewhere, consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial intervention.

But if every single company has the same clause, and there is no way to back out, then there really isn&#039;t a consumer choice.&lt;/blockquote&gt;
Where do I go to buy marshmallows soaked in blue  food coloring? If I want them, and nobody sells them the solution must be judicial intervention, right?

What good is choice if I can&#039;t choose what I want?

The point is, a contract term you don&#039;t like is no different from a product you don&#039;t like.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>As long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop elsewhere, consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial intervention.</p>
<p>But if every single company has the same clause, and there is no way to back out, then there really isn&#8217;t a consumer choice.</p></blockquote>
<p>Where do I go to buy marshmallows soaked in blue  food coloring? If I want them, and nobody sells them the solution must be judicial intervention, right?</p>
<p>What good is choice if I can&#8217;t choose what I want?</p>
<p>The point is, a contract term you don&#8217;t like is no different from a product you don&#8217;t like.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: federalist		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10987</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[federalist]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2008 01:09:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10987</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[One problem with MBA is that arbitrators do not always follow the law, and that&#039;s a problem.  When I was in law school, I was helping out a buddy with a claim under Ohio&#039;s lemon law, and there was an MBA, and the arbitrator basically ruled contrary to the law in calculating damages, when we called to ask what was up, we were told that the law was just a guide.  Now I am sorry, I don&#039;t like out-of-control suits etc., but the bottom line is that arbitration company should have suffered some serious consequences.  Arbitrators should be on the hook for crap like that.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One problem with MBA is that arbitrators do not always follow the law, and that&#8217;s a problem.  When I was in law school, I was helping out a buddy with a claim under Ohio&#8217;s lemon law, and there was an MBA, and the arbitrator basically ruled contrary to the law in calculating damages, when we called to ask what was up, we were told that the law was just a guide.  Now I am sorry, I don&#8217;t like out-of-control suits etc., but the bottom line is that arbitration company should have suffered some serious consequences.  Arbitrators should be on the hook for crap like that.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: William Nuesslein		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10986</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[William Nuesslein]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 19:12:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10986</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A good portion of regular mail consists of credit card solicitations. If there was a niche for contracts without MBA, there would be somebody to pick up that market share. Such a niche would appear if there was any credible evidence of systemic unfairness against the average customer. There would be hundreds of newspaper stories and score of television spots showing how the credit card companies are screwing people.

The market has selected for MBA contracts.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A good portion of regular mail consists of credit card solicitations. If there was a niche for contracts without MBA, there would be somebody to pick up that market share. Such a niche would appear if there was any credible evidence of systemic unfairness against the average customer. There would be hundreds of newspaper stories and score of television spots showing how the credit card companies are screwing people.</p>
<p>The market has selected for MBA contracts.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Ted		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10985</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ted]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 18:59:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10985</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Courts won&#039;t enforce damages caps in contract, calling such limits &quot;unconscionable.&quot;  &lt;i&gt;E.g., Collins v. Uniroyal&lt;/i&gt;, 315 A.2d 216 (N.J. 1974).  I&#039;ve long thought that the most effective tort reform would be to legislatively undo this judicially created limit on the right to contract.  Better to let the marketplace decide the appropriate limits on damages than legislatures.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Courts won&#8217;t enforce damages caps in contract, calling such limits &#8220;unconscionable.&#8221;  <i>E.g., Collins v. Uniroyal</i>, 315 A.2d 216 (N.J. 1974).  I&#8217;ve long thought that the most effective tort reform would be to legislatively undo this judicially created limit on the right to contract.  Better to let the marketplace decide the appropriate limits on damages than legislatures.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: billb		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10984</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[billb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 16:13:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10984</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Not to turn this thread into a dissertation (lord knows I don&#039;t need to write another one), but do you have any idea, Ted, why the market went to binding arbitration rather than stipulated damage caps? It seems to me that if the data is right and consumers tend to do better in arbitration than they do in front of juries, the right way to avoid jackpot lawsuits would be to put clauses in limiting non-economic damages. Perhaps that&#039;s what bothers me most now that I&#039;ve really thought about it in detail. Given that these corporations think that most consumers will acquiesce to these sorts of terms, why not get the best of both worlds by guaranteeing that frivolous awards are capped? Is the concern that judges are less predictable than arbiters? Or does this idea lend some credence to the argument that corporations and the arbiters they use are somehow colluding (or at least appear to collude)?
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Not to turn this thread into a dissertation (lord knows I don&#8217;t need to write another one), but do you have any idea, Ted, why the market went to binding arbitration rather than stipulated damage caps? It seems to me that if the data is right and consumers tend to do better in arbitration than they do in front of juries, the right way to avoid jackpot lawsuits would be to put clauses in limiting non-economic damages. Perhaps that&#8217;s what bothers me most now that I&#8217;ve really thought about it in detail. Given that these corporations think that most consumers will acquiesce to these sorts of terms, why not get the best of both worlds by guaranteeing that frivolous awards are capped? Is the concern that judges are less predictable than arbiters? Or does this idea lend some credence to the argument that corporations and the arbiters they use are somehow colluding (or at least appear to collude)?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: billb		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10983</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[billb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 16:05:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10983</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Ted: I think we can agree on the latter half of #1. I&#039;m not sure some bold type in pages of legal documents is really all that affective for knowing waiver, but if people are initialing/signing next to a clause without thinking about the consequences, that&#039;s another story. It&#039;s probably enough to make sure that consumers are asking themselves if they&#039;re getting the value they want from signing away the right to a regular lawsuit.

On #2, care to make a counter-offer? :) I mostly framed my offer that way because you said, &quot;No company will offer me a contract with a free blue pony, no matter how much I offer to raise my interest rates,&quot; which is clearly not true. Such absolute statements beg to be confronted with ridiculous evidence to the contrary. What fun would it have been to offer to do it for the cost of the blue pony?

All this being said, I&#039;m still not comfortable with the situation I mentioned in your 3-wheeler post. I.e., the way a typical car sale goes down:  you negotiate the car with a salesman and handshake on a deal, and then go back to the business office to &quot;work out the details&quot; wherein the buyer gives up more in return for nothing explicit. I don&#039;t really have a good solution, since the savvy buyer must assume that these are factored into the price while, I assume, the unsavvy simply suffer the additional clauses or sign without reading. It&#039;d be nice to make clear somehow that  when you go to buy a car, you&#039;re really buying a contract with the car company.

Tracy: Insurance is specifically designed to hedge such risks. Assuming that by offering a price for the MBA clause, a company loses no sales (a reasonable assumption, I think, it might even gain some sales), then all of the additional revenue can be used to hedge the risk either through insurance products or, more likely, through disciplined investment (don&#039;t giant companies have lawsuit funds already?). Presumably the price they set for buying off the MBA clause will reflect the odds of jackpot lawsuits, the popularity of buying it off, and the average settlement cost over the past several years (inflation adjusted), and whatever other actuarial metrics seem important.

Maybe I&#039;m wrong, and there&#039;s no interest in a market for the right to sue. In which case, my proposal will die on the vine, but if there is a market, if the companies don&#039;t do it themselves, somebody will come along and agree to take on some of that risk for the money.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ted: I think we can agree on the latter half of #1. I&#8217;m not sure some bold type in pages of legal documents is really all that affective for knowing waiver, but if people are initialing/signing next to a clause without thinking about the consequences, that&#8217;s another story. It&#8217;s probably enough to make sure that consumers are asking themselves if they&#8217;re getting the value they want from signing away the right to a regular lawsuit.</p>
<p>On #2, care to make a counter-offer? 🙂 I mostly framed my offer that way because you said, &#8220;No company will offer me a contract with a free blue pony, no matter how much I offer to raise my interest rates,&#8221; which is clearly not true. Such absolute statements beg to be confronted with ridiculous evidence to the contrary. What fun would it have been to offer to do it for the cost of the blue pony?</p>
<p>All this being said, I&#8217;m still not comfortable with the situation I mentioned in your 3-wheeler post. I.e., the way a typical car sale goes down:  you negotiate the car with a salesman and handshake on a deal, and then go back to the business office to &#8220;work out the details&#8221; wherein the buyer gives up more in return for nothing explicit. I don&#8217;t really have a good solution, since the savvy buyer must assume that these are factored into the price while, I assume, the unsavvy simply suffer the additional clauses or sign without reading. It&#8217;d be nice to make clear somehow that  when you go to buy a car, you&#8217;re really buying a contract with the car company.</p>
<p>Tracy: Insurance is specifically designed to hedge such risks. Assuming that by offering a price for the MBA clause, a company loses no sales (a reasonable assumption, I think, it might even gain some sales), then all of the additional revenue can be used to hedge the risk either through insurance products or, more likely, through disciplined investment (don&#8217;t giant companies have lawsuit funds already?). Presumably the price they set for buying off the MBA clause will reflect the odds of jackpot lawsuits, the popularity of buying it off, and the average settlement cost over the past several years (inflation adjusted), and whatever other actuarial metrics seem important.</p>
<p>Maybe I&#8217;m wrong, and there&#8217;s no interest in a market for the right to sue. In which case, my proposal will die on the vine, but if there is a market, if the companies don&#8217;t do it themselves, somebody will come along and agree to take on some of that risk for the money.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: tracy		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10982</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[tracy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 14:44:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10982</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Billb

The problem I see with your logic is that it still exposes businesses to frivolous lawsuits.  The credit card companies (and similar businesses) put the BA on every contract to reduce their risk.  If 25% of their customers opted out then suddenly the benefit to the company is reduced.  A lawsuit that is unsuccessfully pursued can still cost the company millions.  Should the people who opted out of the MBA have to bear to brunt of those cost or will they be spread out to the entire customer base?  My guess is the later.

There is a class of people in this country who are always looking for a chance for the big pay day.  Those are the people who will opt out of the MBA.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Billb</p>
<p>The problem I see with your logic is that it still exposes businesses to frivolous lawsuits.  The credit card companies (and similar businesses) put the BA on every contract to reduce their risk.  If 25% of their customers opted out then suddenly the benefit to the company is reduced.  A lawsuit that is unsuccessfully pursued can still cost the company millions.  Should the people who opted out of the MBA have to bear to brunt of those cost or will they be spread out to the entire customer base?  My guess is the later.</p>
<p>There is a class of people in this country who are always looking for a chance for the big pay day.  Those are the people who will opt out of the MBA.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: xrey		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10981</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[xrey]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 14:28:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10981</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;As long as the price is negotiable &lt;b&gt;and the customer may shop elsewhere,&lt;/b&gt; consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial intervention.&lt;/i&gt;


But if &lt;i&gt;every single company&lt;/i&gt; has the same clause, and there is no way to back out, then there really isn&#039;t a consumer choice.

If so, the answer isn&#039;t &quot;judicial intervention&quot;, but &quot;legislative intervention&quot;.

The last time I bought a car, I actually read through the purchase agreement and asked if there was a BA clause. The dealer just shrugged, but I&#039;m sure there was one buried in there somewhere. I&#039;m not a lawyer, so I just went ahead and bought the car.

What if there was a clause and I crossed it out? Is the dealer able to alter a contract created by Ford Motor Company? Is the only alternative to MBA &quot;don&#039;t every buy a new car&quot;? If one company has it, usually they all do.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>As long as the price is negotiable <b>and the customer may shop elsewhere,</b> consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial intervention.</i></p>
<p>But if <i>every single company</i> has the same clause, and there is no way to back out, then there really isn&#8217;t a consumer choice.</p>
<p>If so, the answer isn&#8217;t &#8220;judicial intervention&#8221;, but &#8220;legislative intervention&#8221;.</p>
<p>The last time I bought a car, I actually read through the purchase agreement and asked if there was a BA clause. The dealer just shrugged, but I&#8217;m sure there was one buried in there somewhere. I&#8217;m not a lawyer, so I just went ahead and bought the car.</p>
<p>What if there was a clause and I crossed it out? Is the dealer able to alter a contract created by Ford Motor Company? Is the only alternative to MBA &#8220;don&#8217;t every buy a new car&#8221;? If one company has it, usually they all do.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Ted		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10980</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ted]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 14:09:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10980</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Billb:

1) I wouldn&#039;t object strongly to requiring arbitration clauses to be printed in bold or to require an affirmative waiver.

2) Your blue-pony sidestep isn&#039;t playing fair.  I&#039;d be happy to provide you a credit card without MBA for a billion dollars a year, too, so if that&#039;s all you need to solve your problems, you&#039;re on board.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Billb:</p>
<p>1) I wouldn&#8217;t object strongly to requiring arbitration clauses to be printed in bold or to require an affirmative waiver.</p>
<p>2) Your blue-pony sidestep isn&#8217;t playing fair.  I&#8217;d be happy to provide you a credit card without MBA for a billion dollars a year, too, so if that&#8217;s all you need to solve your problems, you&#8217;re on board.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: billb		</title>
		<link>https://www.overlawyered.com/2008/02/arbitration-and-coercion/comment-page-1/#comment-10979</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[billb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 12:43:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://overlawyered.com/wpblog/?p=5928#comment-10979</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[OBQuiet: I imagine a simpler model. No negotiation, but something more of a menu. Put a dollar figure on contract terms that are often objected to by savvy customers. They can then pay more for the privilege to strike such terms (or, heck, turn it on its head and offer to add terms for increased discounts). I think the argument over knowing waiver would be moot if everyone was presented the opportunity to shave half a point on their CC interest rate or save $5 a month on their cell service plan by agreeing to BA. It wouldn&#039;t be waiver anymore it would be given up &quot;for valuable consideration&quot;. :)


]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>OBQuiet: I imagine a simpler model. No negotiation, but something more of a menu. Put a dollar figure on contract terms that are often objected to by savvy customers. They can then pay more for the privilege to strike such terms (or, heck, turn it on its head and offer to add terms for increased discounts). I think the argument over knowing waiver would be moot if everyone was presented the opportunity to shave half a point on their CC interest rate or save $5 a month on their cell service plan by agreeing to BA. It wouldn&#8217;t be waiver anymore it would be given up &#8220;for valuable consideration&#8221;. 🙂</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
