Serial rapists, really? If that were the case then they would be violating more laws than just Title IX. So you reported all of these rapists to the New Haven police department, right? If not then I guess you are guilty of covering up these horrendous crimes. Oh, was this just hyperbole on your part? When you use such language it reflects on your credibility. It makes you seem like an irrational, left wing ideologue.

DKE members tend to be wealthy legacy admissions (noted drunken imbecile George W. Bush was in DKE) or athletes, and so they tended to be served justice-lite.

Such intemperate language, Max. I would suggest you post your comments on Daily Kos or Democratic Underground. Those website would be much more in tune with such ravings.

Victimized students filed complaints. Secret hearings were held at ExComm and slaps on the wrist were handed out. DKE members tend to be wealthy legacy admissions (noted drunken imbecile George W. Bush was in DKE) or athletes, and so they tended to be served justice-lite.

I saw more than a few “true threats” by DKE members in my time there. Frankly, as an alumni I’m appalled to see that DKE previously could use Yale systems for their events — we were always told that, because DKE was totally unaffiliated with Yale, there was nothing the administrators could do. Seems that Yale stupidly relaxed its attitude towards DKE and paid the price.

I don’t think DKE should be singled out for special treatment; I think exactly the opposite: DKE members should be punished like everyone else for their transgressions. Problem is (or at least was), they weren’t, because Daddy’s some bigshot hedge fund trader or because Junior has a good curveball.

If schools officials have actual knowledge of sexual harassment like serial rapes, and are deliberately indifferent to it, then the school can be liable under Title IX. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). And Title IX is not the only potential cause of action.

School officials can’t fix problems if you don’t bring to their attention.

While the frat boys’ vile chants making light of a lack of sexual consent did not constitute a “true threat” or similar category of unprotected speech (see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)), they could be relevant circumstantial evidence against them in a proceeding in which they were accused of sexual assault.

There is a big difference between the mere use of speech as circumstantial evidence in proving a non-speech-related crime, and speech itself being the crime and being directly punished as such. Compare Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2001) (professor’s writings expressing yearning for the death of a community college’s president and fantasy about the funeral of a trustee, were protected speech, not true threats, and could not constitutionally be punished under the college’s anti-violence policy).

The former is more readily permissible than the latter. See also Papish v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S 667 (1973) (state college couldn’t discipline graduate student for her vulgar public speech).

A private college can voluntarily discipline students for offensive speech without violating the First Amendment, but if the government forces it to do so, then that violates the First Amendment unless the speech is unprotected (that is, unprotected against government restrictions). See, e.g., Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (First Amendment violated if private employer restricted speech at the behest of the government rather than on its own initiative); Korb v. Lehman, 919 F.2d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 1990) (government could not pressure private employer to fire employee for speech).

The Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between what a private institution can do voluntarily and what the government can force it to do. See, e.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247, 248 (1963) (finding unconstitutional a city ordinance which required restaurants to be segregated, because imposing the requirement on restaurant owners violated the equal protection rights of patrons, even though back then, voluntary discrimination by a private institution was not deemed illegal by the courts); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (finding unconstitutional a state law requiring that at least 80% of each employer’s employees be native-born citizens or qualified electors, because imposing the requirement on employers violated the equal protection rights of their employees, even though back then, the courts considered voluntary discrimination by employers to be legal).