The policy should be balanced. The liability faced by businesses that ban guns should look like the liability faced by those who do not ban guns. We should not allow liability to force businesses to ban guns.

Not relevant to this Tennessee law. Hupp was prohibited from carrying her pistol by Texas state law, not the owners of Luby’s.

I’m not a lawyer but it sure seems like there should be a responsibility on a property owner if they explicitly ban a specific thing.

Anonymous Attorney

Your comment amounts to the contention that people already have the right to pursue the claims protected by the statute.

If what you say is true, then the statute is redundant but harmless and Walter’s claim that it advances gun rights at the expense of contract and private property rights is meritless.

One of the most noted incidents…

On October 16, 1991, 35-year-old George Jo Hennard, an unemployed[3] merchant mariner who was described by others as angry and withdrawn, with a dislike of women and ethnic minorities, drove his blue 1987 Ford Ranger pickup truck through the plate-glass front window of a Luby’s Cafeteria in Killeen, Texas.[2] Yelling, “All women of Killeen and Belton are vipers! This is what you’ve done to me and my family! This is what Bell County did to me…This is payback day!” Hennard opened fire on its patrons and staff with both a 9mm Glock 17 pistol and a 9mm Ruger P89 pistol.[4][5] He stalked, shot, and killed 23 people, ten of them with single shots to the head, and wounded another 27 before committing suicide.[2] Approximately 140 people were in the restaurant.

It was National Boss’s Day and the restaurant was crowded.[6][7] At first, bystanders thought the crash was an accident, but the shooting started almost immediately.[1] The first victim was veterinarian Michael Griffith.[8] Another patron, Tommy Vaughn, threw himself through a rear window of the restaurant, sustaining injuries, but providing an escape route for himself and other customers.[1]

Hennard reloaded at least three times before fleeing to the bathroom after a brief shootout with police officers. During the shootout, Hennard was wounded by the police. The incident ended when he committed suicide by shooting himself in the head.[2][7]

Suzanna Gratia Hupp, who was present at the shooting where both of her parents were killed. She later testified that she would have liked to have had her gun during the shooting, but said, “it was a hundred feet away in my car” (she had feared that if she was caught carrying her gun she might lose her chiropractor’s license).[12] She testified across the country in support of concealed handgun laws, and was elected to the Texas House of Representatives in 1996.[

2. Are the victims in such scenarios unable to file premises liability or other tort suits to begin with? I seriously doubt it.

3. Could plaintiff’s counsel in such a suit make copious use of the “gun-free” zone as contributing factor? I see no reason why not.

4. How exactly do we establish causation in such situations? We’d have to assume that in any of them, the aggrieved packer could have taken out the attacker.

5. Are packers without the ability to, you know, decline to visit private gun-free zones? Anyone making them go? Nope, didn’t think so.

This is gimmicky, useless, hysterical and supremely butt-kissy legislation. I’ll side with Walter.

In most states, you’re wrong. If you are the victim of a crime, in many states, the owner or possessor of the property has no duty to protect you against assault by a 3d party. See e.g., Dykema v. Gus Macker Enterprises, Inc., 492 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (“The general rule is that there is no duty to aid or protect another.”). States following the Restatement (2d Ed.) of Torts, generally recognize an exception to this rule when there is a “special relationship” between the owner or possessor and the injured person. Recognized special relationships “include common carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, employer-employee, landlord-tenant, and invitor-invitee.” Id. 492 N.W.2d at 474. However, the special relationship doctrine usually is not extended to cover injuries caused by 3d parties, such as criminals. A few states, such as Kentucky, have adopted the formulation in the Restatement (3d Ed.) of Torts, which eliminates determining duties owned based on whether the person injured was an invitee, licensee or trespasser, in favor of factually based analysis on whether the injury was proximately caused by a risk which was reasonably foreseeable. In locations where there is a history of violent criminal activity, even before Kentucky adopted the Restatement 3d’s standards, an owner or possessor had a duty to invitees to protect them from criminal violence. The new Tennessee law appears to extend the reasonably foreseeable test to CCW holders on the assumption that they would protect themselves and others, but for the owner or possessor’s decision to prohibit the carrying of firearms on the premises. It further provides the owner or possessor immunity from an action based on the statute, which created a new cause of action but does not purport to restrict causes of action already recognized by Tennessee law, should the owner or possessor authorize CCW permit holders to carry firearms on the premises. So, “why should [CCW] holders get special treatment?” Apparently, because the Tennessee legislature decided that persons who can pass the back-ground check and undergo the required training should either be allowed to defend themselves, or the owner or possessor who prohibits that becomes very close to the insurer of the CCW holder, even if Tennessee law does not otherwise provide a remedy for the CCW holder against the owner or possessor.

You also stated:
“My concern on this subject mainly dealt with an employer restricting my ability to have a weapon locked in my vehicle, in the parking lot. The statement that I made in earlier posts is that if my employer has this policy, they should be responsible for my security on my way to and from work, since their policy has restricted my ability to provide for my own security.”

The statute isn’t express on this point, but by creating a new cause of action by statute, it arguably creates an implied exception to the exclusive remedy of the Tennessee workers’ compensation law. Generally, when an employee is injured on the job, workers’ compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy against the employer. Non-economic damages (e.g., damages for personal injuries) are not recoverable from the employer. A tort action against the 3d party who caused the injuries is still available (which is subject to the workers’ compensation insurer’s subrogation rights against any recovery), but, most criminals aren’t wealthy and most liability insurance policies contain exclusions from coverage for intentional acts. So, a right of recovery against the criminal who caused the injuries is fairly hollow. If the new statute is held to imply an exception to the workers’ compensation law’s exclusive remedy rule, then a CCW holder employee who was injured in a way that s/he could reasonably have prevented by use of a handgun to defend him/herself may be able to recover personal injury damages from his/her employer and the employer’s liability insurer. That will likely cause possessors and owners and their liability insurers to re-consider the risks of prohibiting CCW holders from carrying concealed handguns on their premises. I’d think you’d support that.

@ Robert Allen:
“but why shouldn’t I be able to declare my private property as . . . gun-free?”

You can do so, or not, at your choice. The Tennessee statute does not mandate a choice. Rather, if allocates liability for the foreseeable risks of harm arising from a decision to prohibit CCW holders the ability to protect themselves, to the owner or possessor who decides to prohibit firearms on the property. IMO, making the person who makes the choice potentially liable for the consequences of his/her decision is consistent with those who believe we should bear personal responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of our decisions. Whether that is a “Conservative” position, in today’s political climate, I will not venture an opinion on.