That said, I’ll disagree with some of the “bugs” in the article. In regards the amendment process, I’d argue the difficulty is a feature, not a bug, in that it requires a broad consensus over an extended period of time to enact amendments. Perhaps its a quibble on how difficult (magnitude of consensus) and the time scale involved, but unless there is a persuasive, specific, argument of how a different system would work better, I take the Engineers motto of “don’t fix what ain’t broke” position.

One point that Ilya is silent upon, where I take exception in the Constitution: Congress is given the power to regulate the value of money.

“To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;”

The regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin is the problem. The Framers grave error was this and is the root of many of the problems today. IF it had been that the Federal Government could coin money, of gold or silver only, and that the unit of currency was only permitted to be weight of fine metal, much of the ills of the current era would be avoided. The scope and scale of the Government would be naturally limited in such a system. Wars of convenience (most of current conflicts) couldn’t be financed, and therefore would be avoided. The strip mining of the middle and working classes by financialization would be impractical (who benefits when new dollars are printed into existence? Those who get them first, which are the already rich and powerful).

Another one that is covered on this page quite often: Securing for limited times to authors and inventors. Yeah….limited….how many years? Upwards of a hundred years?

If you actually bother to read the VC article by Ilya Somin, he is absolutely NOT suggesting that the Supreme Court take it upon himself to fix the things he doesn’t like.

Also, go back and re-read the first sentence or two in Walter’s blurb.

This isn’t about fixing the things Ilya, or you, think are wrong with the constitution as it is, it’s about testing the impartiality of a method of constitutional analysis by looking for places where that analysis cuts against the outcome the user of that method would prefer on a policy basis.