Posts Tagged ‘social media’

FOSTA, SESTA, and Section 230

The U.S. House of Representatives appears about to vote on a bill forcing platforms to monitor users’ content and undermining Section 230, charter of freedom for online social media, all in the name of the widening campaign against real or imagined trafficking. [Electronic Frontier Foundation; Eric Goldman post and podcast and background from September; Adam Brandon, FreedomWorks; earlier here, etc.] More: John Samples, Cato; Cathy Gellis, TechDirt.

German social media law: early takedowns spur outcry

“A new law meant to curtail hate speech on social media in Germany is stifling free speech and making martyrs out of anti-immigrant politicians whose posts are deleted, the top-selling Bild newspaper said on Thursday” under the headline “Please spare us the thought police!” [Michelle Martin, Thomson Reuters] In one probably intended effect of the draconian law — drafted by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ruling Christian Democrats — Twitter moved to take down some pronouncements by politicians from the nationalist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. But the NetzDG enactment, as it is known, has quickly had a number of less expected applications, including the blockage of a satirical publication that had mimicked the tone of an AfD leader, and even the deletion of a years-earlier tweet by Justice Minister Heiko Maas, a champion of the law, in which he had called an author an “idiot.” [Reuters; AFP/The National; DW; Tim Cushing/TechDirt; earlier here, here, here, here, and here]

Free speech roundup

Scrubbing consumer reviews: “Decline and fall of the dumb copyright trick”

One thing professionals “have tried to do to avoid negative online reviews is to find ways of claiming some kind of copyright in any review posted by a former client, then suing the negative reviewer for copyright infringement….Finally, the courts are catching up.” [Ron Coleman, Likelihood of Confusion; Pamela Chestek; Eric Goldman in 2013 on Goren dispute with Ripoff Report]

Free speech roundup

  • Florida “health coach” charges for nutrition advice, isn’t a licensed dietitian. Does she have a First Amendment defense? [Scott Shackford]
  • Results of Russian social-media manipulation episode could include foot in door for regulation of Internet speech [John Samples, Cato]
  • Some in Australia having trouble distinguishing “impersonation” of government from anti-government satire [Timothy Geigner, TechDirt]
  • Before deep-pocket publications can report on sexual misconduct by persons in high places, gauntlet of legal review needs to be run with special attention to on-the-record sources [Mike Masnick, TechDirt]
  • Ohio lawmaker introduces anti-SLAPP bill that pioneers novel protections for anonymous speakers [John Samples, Cato]
  • “Nadine Strossen’s Next Book — ‘Hate: Why We Should Resist it With Free Speech, Not Censorship'” [Ronald K.L. Collins] “Sanford Ungar Heads New Free Speech Project at Georgetown University” [same]

Liability roundup

  • Another dubious lawsuit blaming terrorism on social media from law firm with phone number for a name [Tim Cushing]
  • Courts reverse two big talc/baby powder jury verdicts against Johnson & Johnson [Tina Bellon and Nate Raymond, Reuters ($417 million, California); Insurance Journal ($72 million, Missouri)]
  • “US-Based Tech Companies Subject to Worldwide Jurisdiction as Judicial Comity Takes a Back Seat” [Moin Yahya, WLF on Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Google v. Equustek Solutions]
  • Richard Epstein wrote the Encyclopedia of Libertarianism’s entry on liability, tort and contract;
  • Asbestos: “Judges and juries should learn about a plaintiff’s entire exposure history so they can apportion liability appropriately.” [Phil Goldberg, Forbes]
  • Study of contingent fee litigation in New York City: few cases resolved on dispositive motions, lawyers nearly always take the maximum one-third permitted by law [Eric Helland et al., forthcoming Vanderbilt Law Review/SSRN]

Cop strikes out suing Mckesson, BLM movement, and hashtag

Updating our July roundup item: a Baton Rouge, La. police officer injured at a demonstration sued activist DeRay Mckesson and, purportedly, the Black Lives Matter movement after being injured during a protest. After Mckesson’s lawyers challenged the inclusion of the latter-named movement on the grounds that it is not a juridical person capable of being sued, plaintiff moved “to amend his complaint to add “#BlackLivesMatter” and Black Lives Matter Network, Inc., as Defendant.”

A federal court was not impressed. It ruled that the officer had not pleaded adequate facts to sustain a claim that either Mckesson or the incorporated entity had gone beyond their own rights to speech, as protected by the First Amendment, to become legally responsible for the violent actions of others, that the initial complaint “names as a Defendant a social movement that lacks the capacity to be sued,” and that the attempted amendment to the complaint likewise overlooks that “#BlackLivesMatter” – a hashtag – lacks the capacity to be sued.” (Italics are the court’s.)

The Court judicially notices that the combination of a “pound” or “number” sign (#) and a word or phrase is referred to as a “hashtag” and that hashtags are utilized on the social media website Twitter in order to classify or categorize a user’s particular “tweet,” although the use of hashtags has spread to other social media websites and throughout popular culture. The Court also judicially notices that “#BlackLivesMatter” is a popular hashtag that is frequently used on social media websites.

Plaintiff therefore is attempting to sue a hashtag for damages in tort. For reasons that should be obvious, a hashtag – which is an expression that categorizes or classifies a person’s thought – is not a “juridical person” and therefore lacks the capacity to be sued. Amending the Complaint to add “#BlackLivesMatter” as a Defendant in this matter would be futile because such claims “would be subject to dismissal”; a hashtag is patently incapable of being sued. [citations and footnote omitted]

Rejecting the option of granting plaintiff further leave to amend his complaint,

The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s attempt to bring suit against a social movement and a hashtag evinces either a gross lack of understanding of the concept of capacity or bad faith, which would be an independent ground to deny Plaintiff leave to file a Second Proposed Amended Complaint. The Court therefore shall dismiss this matter with prejudice.

Free speech roundup