“Liability insurance” may be a misnomer, since some of the proposals would require the purchase of bonds against both intentional acts commonly excluded from ordinary liability coverage, and also misadventures for which owners would not presently be held legally responsible (such as third party criminal use of a gun following a theft not occasioned by owner negligence.) [Reuters, Nelson Lund/GMU, Jessica Chasmar/Washington Times, New York Times via Fed Soc, Taranto/WSJ, Josh Blackman]

Would a mandatory insurance scheme survive judicial scrutiny if it were motivated by a desire to burden the exercise of a constitutional right? David Rifkin and Andrew Grossman, WSJ:

Several states… are considering gun-insurance mandates modeled after those for automobile insurance. There is no conceivable public-safety benefit: Insurance policies cover accidents, not intentional crimes, and criminals with illegal guns will just evade the requirement. The real purpose is to make guns less affordable for law-abiding citizens and thereby reduce private gun ownership. Identical constitutionally suspect logic explains proposals to tax the sale of bullets at excessive rates.

The courts, however, are no more likely to allow government to undermine the Second Amendment than to undermine the First. A state cannot circumvent the right to a free press by requiring that an unfriendly newspaper carry millions in libel insurance or pay a thousand-dollar tax on barrels of ink—the real motive, in either case, would be transparent and the regulation struck down. How could the result be any different for the right to keep and bear arms?

(& slightly expanded/adapted version at Cato; The Hill “Blog Briefing Room”)

P.S. The American Insurance Association is opposed to the more ambitious versions of the idea, at least: “Property and casualty insurance does not and cannot cover gun crimes.”

Filed under: constitutional law, guns, insurance