Overlawyered: Chronicling The High Cost Of Our Legal System

Posts Tagged ‘pro se’

Forbes on pro se cases

Kai Falkenberg’s September 3 story in Forbes quotes me (though I promise I told the fact-checker that the Chung’s legal bills were only $83,000) and Overlawyered guest-blogger Steve Hantler. The sidebar to the article lists a number of cases Overlawyered readers might be familiar with.

Before David Giacalone jumps down my throat, let me say that I had a lengthy interview with Falkenberg, detailing my views on pro se litigation, but only the throw-away anecdote about Roy Pearson’s pants suit made it in. (Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decision this spring in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly helps resolve the problem I complained about in that December post.)

Update: Falkenberg writes to let me know that “Regarding the Chungs, the $100,000 references not just the $83,000 in legal fees but other costs associated with Pearson’s claim and was confirmed with their lawyer, Chris Manning.” Fair enough (though I think Manning is including lost sales from Pearson’s picketing the Chungs’ shop, which one might argue does not really reflect legal costs). Let me clarify that I thought that Falkenberg wrote an excellent piece, especially given the limitations of space. Quote of note:

In a study of pro se suits brought between 1995 and 1999 in the federal district court in Manhattan, attorney Jonathan Rosenbloom found that a “disturbing” number of pro se cases were dismissed for asserting claims that were “delusional” or “wholly incredible.” … Rosenbloom also found a lot of frequent filers: Nearly half of the study’s 765 pro se litigants filed at least one previous suit in that court, including one who filed 57 complaints in one year.

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The Litigation Lobby’s “frivolous” bait-and-switch: the Judge Roy Pearson pants-suit

Second Milberg Weiss Justice Fellow, same as the first? Bizarro-Overlawyered twists itself into contortions over the infamous $54 million Judge Pearson pants-suit. Cyrus Dugger’s replacement as Milberg Weiss Justice Fellow, Kia Franklin, recognizes that the anti-reform cause can’t be seen endorsing the patently-ridiculous lawsuit that is the laughingstock of the world. So, she dances over the issue: yes, this case is frivolous, but frivolous cases are rare, so there are no lessons to learn from the fact that a small business was forced to pay tens of thousands of dollars litigating an overbroad consumer-fraud claim, to the point that it was willing to pay $12,000 over a pair of pants to make the lawsuit go away and stop the financial bleeding.

Her evidence is a Public Citizen study—but she ignores our 2006 post noting that Public Citizen got its math wrong, and even distorts the distorted statistic beyond what Public Citizen claimed. (Public Citizen gerrymandered its claim to falsely say businesses were 69% more likely to be sanctioned for frivolousness than individual tort plaintiffs, but Franklin misreads that to say individuals, which is false even by Public Citizen’s numbers, which found by its own measure that individuals were sanctioned for frivolousness 86% more often than corporations. Note also the difference between the inaccurate “more likely” and “more often.”)

The really funny thing is that, under the Public Citizen narrow definition of “frivolous lawsuit” used in its study, Judge Pearson’s suit is not frivolous! When politicians speak of “frivolous” cases, they use it in the everyday English sense of “silly”: they mean the meritless cases, where, because of far-fetched legal theories, junk science, or overbroad liability rules, plaintiffs seek or realize recovery far beyond what makes good social policy—cases like Roy Pearson’s. Public Citizen’s study, however, in a typical litigation-lobby bait-and-switch (see, e.g., the Kerry/Edwards malpractice reform plan), defines “frivolous” with the narrow technical legal definition so that it can conclude (like Franklin) that frivolous litigation is “rare” and thus not a problem. (Amazing how many problems disappear when you assume them away.) The definition is so narrow that Pearson’s suit is outside of it: Pearson defeated motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and received a $12,000 offer of judgment. (Pearson is apparently sufficiently emotionally troubled that he thinks he has a better shot seeking tens of millions from a couple of immigrant Korean dry cleaners than the thousands of dollars offered in settlement for a pair of pants, even though the judge who will be ruling on his case has given him plenty of hints that he has no hope of success.) The Pearson suit would have been excluded from Public Citizen’s count of frivolous suits for a second reason: Public Citizen ignored pro se lawsuits brought by attorneys like Pearson in its count of frivolous suits, as it had to to deflate the number of sanctions issued against individual tort plaintiffs and falsely claim that corporations are sanctioned more often.

We’re excited to see Franklin join the world of reformers and recognize that many more lawsuits are frivolous than what Public Citizen recognizes. We encourage her to read the data and arguments of those she mistakenly claims to oppose, and to scrutinize those she mistakenly thinks are her allies a bit more closely. Why is it alright for wealthy white trial lawyers to extort billions from big business using the same ad terrorem tactics (and even the same consumer-protection laws!) as a poor African-American pro se did to extort $12,000 from a small business? We encourage Franklin to examine the Association of Trial Lawyers of America’s racial double-standard.

And since Franklin agrees that the Pearson lawsuit is frivolous, we are eager to hear how she would define a frivolous lawsuit, and hope that she uses that definition consistently for both the Milberg Weisses of the world as well as African-American city employees.

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June 11 roundup

Updating earlier stories:

  • The Judge Pearson consumer fraud suit starts today. It’s exceedingly silly, but ATLA’s attack on Judge Pearson is hypocritical: the only difference between this consumer fraud suit and the consumer fraud suits ATLA supports is that it’s an African-American pro se going against a shallow pocket instead of a well-funded bunch of millionaires going against a deep pocket. The Fisher blog @ WaPo notes a publicity-stunt settlement offer. [via TaxProf blog]
  • Wesley Snipes playing the race card in his tax evasion prosecution would have more resonance if his white co-defendant weren’t still in jail while he’s out on bail. [Tax Prof; earlier, Nov. 22]
  • “Party mom host set for Virginia jail term” for daring to ensure high school students didn’t drink and drive by providing a safe haven for underage drinking. Earlier: June 2005. [WaPo]
  • Sorry, schadenfreude fans: Fred Baron settles with Baron & Budd. [Texas Lawyer; earlier Sep. 4]
  • Blackmail-through-civil discovery lawyer Ted Roberts (Mar. 19 and links therein) seeks new trial. [Texas Lawyer]
  • Second Circuit doesn’t quite yet decide Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz libel tourism suit (Oct. 2003). [Bashman roundup of links]
  • NFL drops claims to trademarking “The Big Game” as a euphemism for the trademarked “Super Bowl” (Jan. 31) [Lattman]
  • More on the Supreme Court’s “fake mental retardation to get out of the death penalty” decision, Atkins v. Virginia (Feb. 2005; Sep. 2003). [LA Times]
  • What does Overlawyered favorite Rex deGeorge (Sep. 2004) have to do with The Apprentice? [Real Estalker]

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Glendora v. Savarino: Bob Hope photos prove unavailing

Rather than even try to summarize the case, we’ll let Law.com do it for us: “A New York judge has limited a public-access TV personality’s use of small claims courts following her repeated abuse of the system. In dismissing her claim that a Cablevision employee ‘poisoned’ her sponsors’ minds, the judge noted that the woman, who goes by the name Glendora, submitted 360 handwritten pages of documentation, including ‘multiple copies of a 60-year-old photo of the plaintiff with Bob Hope … [and] commentary about the impressive geographic expanse of the City of Yonkers.'” (Mark Fass, “Old Photos of Bob Hope Fail to Carry the Day for Litigious TV Personality”, New York Law Journal, May 3).

P.S. Glendora’s website is here (plays video)(hat tip Gunner of No Quarters Blog, who suggests checking out show # 4260 for more on the hostess’s style in suit-filing).

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Litigious clients file lawsuits

Courtesy of Judicial Reports, a cautionary tale for lawyers: be careful when you accept litigious clients. The law firm of Wallace & Minchenberg wasn’t, and it came back to bite them:

Bennett A. Cohen kept getting hurt in elevators — or so he claimed. The lawyers he hired to exact compensation from the culprits responsible for the injuries he allegedly sustained in four elevator mishaps between 1989 and 1992 must have suspected that their litigious client might eventually turn on them, as he did. When the last of the elevator tort claims collapsed, Cohen sued the law firm for malpractice for allegedly mishandling his slam-dunk tort suits.

A lower court in Brooklyn refused to dismiss Cohen’s suits, but the Appellate Division said that law firms can’t be guilty of malpractice for failing to properly prosecute cases without any merit to begin with.

I’m sure that’s of great comfort to the elevator maintenance companies who were originally sued by the law firm on behalf of Cohen.

(Too bad Cohen was representing himself pro se in his lawsuit against Wallace & Minchenberg. Otherwise he could have sued the lawyers who represented him in this lawsuit for failing to win against his former lawyers.)

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Playing “Redneck Woman” on the jukebox…

…resulted in a pro se suit from a black customer alleging that the airing of the popular country song constituted racial discrimination. The Fifth Circuit upheld a lower court’s decision to dismiss the suit against the Wichita, Kansas restaurant. (Brackens v. Texas Roadhouse in Wichita (PDF); Mississippi Law Blog, Feb. 6).

Incidentally, even before posting this item, this website already provides one of the very few current search hits on “Redneck Woman” + “Fifth Circuit”.

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Quitting while you’re behind

Ohio attorney John Ferron, and his client/serial plaintiff, Nathaniel Burdge, thought they had discovered a good moneymaking scheme. They found an obscure Ohio consumer protection statute, one which required retailers to stop printing credit card numbers or expiration dates on sales receipts, and they began suing retailers left and right, claiming the law entitled them to $200 in damages (plus, of course, attorneys fees) for every violation of the law. (The law had only been enacted in 2004, so many retailers were not in compliance.)

Fortunately — though not for Ferron or Burdge — Ohio judges had some common sense, and most quickly held that the words of the statute which explicitly stated that to sue, one had to be “a person injured by a violation” actually meant what they said. Since Burdge wasn’t actually injured, they dismissed his lawsuits. That didn’t deter Ferron/Burdge; they kept filing the suits and kept appealing the dismissals. Finally, one appeals court had enough (PDF), and denounced them in ringing language:

Burdge could not demonstrate that an actual injury was not a required element of his claims because R.C. 1345.18 explicitly sets out an injury requirement. Additionally, Burdge and his attorney had been repeatedly advised of this injury requirement by trial courts in opinions decided on their merits prior to March 2, 2006, when the notice of appeal was filed in this case.21 The facts as pleaded in the complaint in this and the other cases indicate that Burdge purposely made purchases at stores that were printing his expiration date on his receipt in order to recoup statutory damages totaling at least $12,800. Burdge’s actions are totally inconsistent with any allegation of actual injury; rather, his actions demonstrate that he attempted to reap a profit from this activity.

We are offended by the contrived nature of this frivolous action, which has wasted much time, paper, and other resources to the prejudice of legitimate disputes between parties, especially those involving the consumer-protection laws of Ohio.

They sanctioned Ferron/Burdge $3,000 for filing a frivolous appeal. (But not, it should be noted, for the frivolous lawsuit itself.)

Read On…

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Government rules raising litigation costs

Todd Zywicki posts at the Volokh Conspiracy on the issue of professional licensing as a form of economic protectionism; the comment section quickly turns to the issue of attorney licensing. Eliminating lawyer licensing might be one way to lower the costs of litigation; another way would be to allow “unbundling” of lawyer services — to allow lawyers to provide some services to litigants but not full service representation. (For instance, allowing lawyers to provide research and prepare papers on behalf of litigants, but not to go into court.)

The current legal system is hostile to such an approach, however. On Wednesday, a Federal magistrate judge ruled that a New Jersey lawyer violated ethics rules when he “ghostwrote” pleadings on behalf of a pro-se litigant:

First and foremost, she said, courts generally construe pro se litigants’ pleadings liberally and are more flexible in applying procedural rules. “Simply stated, courts often act as referees charged with ensuring a fair fight,” she said. “This becomes an obvious problem when the Court is giving extra latitude to a purported pro se litigant who is receiving secret professional help.”

[…]

As for the societal benefits of unbundled services, Bongiovanni remarked, “This is not to say that this court does not believe that unbundled legal services, in some form, may be beneficial to the equal administration of justice. But, when viewed under the current RPC, ghostwriting is antithetical to the public interest.”

Bongiovanni ordered that Shapiro enter an appearance by March 30 if he wants to represent Delso, or else cease communicating with her about the case.

The problem, according to the judge, was that the lawyer’s assistance to the litigant wasn’t disclosed to the court. You may wonder why they didn’t just disclose it; the reason likely was because disclosing it could unravel the whole non-full service scheme, and force the attorney to represent the litigant in court.

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Frivolous suits and inadequate sanctions, redux

A frolic and detour over at Bizarro-Overlawyered led me to this post over at The Tortellini, which parrots the common trial lawyer argument that there’s no need for tort reform because courts currently have the power to sanction frivolous lawsuits. But the example cited actually demonstrates exactly the opposite: current procedures are insufficient for preventing frivolous litigation.

In 2004, an Ohio resident named Thomas Starks arrived at an Econo Lodge in Tennessee at 4:40 AM. He spent a few hours relaxing, and then went to sleep at 7:30 AM. A few hours later the hotel called to wake him up, saying that he had missed the 11:00 AM checkout time. I guess he was cranky from lack of sleep, because he insisted that he hadn’t stayed for a full day and therefore shouldn’t have to pay the full day’s room rental rate of $46. Eventually, he paid up and left.

The horrible treatment by the hotel in forcing him to actually pay for his room led, as you can probably guess, to a lawsuit (filed pro se) against Econo Lodge and Choice Hotels — but, for some reason, not the operators of the Econo Lodge franchise in question. Starks demanded a $46 refund, $750,000 in damages, and a lifetime pass to stay free at Econo Lodge (I’m not making this up. If you can figure out why someone with $750,000 would stay at an Econo Lodge, let me know.)

The lawsuit was ultimately dismissed; for the many reasons explained by the court (PDF of opinion):

But Starks proceeded to sue the wrong people, in the wrong place, for a wrong wrong: (1) it wasn’t a wrong, (2) Hamilton County, Ohio, was not the right place, and (3) and even if there were a wrong, it wasn’t committed by these defendants.

Indeed, the court found this suit so flagrantly frivolous that it assessed sanctions of $2,500 against Mr. Starks. So what’s the problem? Well, perhaps it might be clearer if I point out that the above quote is actually from the appellate court. That’s right: Mr. Starks filed this suit, had it dismissed, and then had the nerve to appeal the trial court’s ruling. Only at that latter stage of the case were these sanctions — which almost certainly do not come close to compensating the defendants for their legal fees — imposed. (The court left the door open to possibly increasing the sanctions if the attorneys filed additional paperwork, but did not guarantee it; in any case, the judges were skeptical that the defendants would ever be able to collect.) And even so, one of the judges felt the need to apologize for the sanctions: “While the court system must remain open for the redress of a citizen’s perceived injustices, there is a point at which even the most liberal interpretation of personal rights fails in the light of common sense. This is one such case.”

Read On…

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