Walter stole my thunder on the dismissal of the blog comment lawsuit against Lycos, but I thought it raised an important point. One of the common refrains of the Trial Lawyer crowd is that tort reform is not needed, because there are already mechanisms for the courts to deal with frivolous litigation, and because contingency fees mean that plaintiff’s lawyers have no incentive to take on meritless cases. The theory of tort reformers, on the other hand, is that the lottery nature of litigation means that plaintiff’s attorneys can take on long shot cases, because they only need to win a handful of “deep pockets” suits to come out ahead.

Which theory best explains lawsuits like this one? It’s difficult for Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to be much clearer. It grants (as the First Circuit noted) “broad immunity to entities, such as Lycos, that facilitate the speech of others on the Internet.” This isn’t controversial; the First Circuit described its decision as “joining the other courts that have uniformly given effect to Section 230 in similar circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) So why would the plaintiffs not only sue on such a meritless theory, but actually appeal after losing in the District Court?

(I should note that I don’t have any specific evidence that this was a contingency case; nonetheless, the larger issue — namely, how can we successfully disincentivize plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers from bringing meritless suits — remains. Immunity from liability is great — but it isn’t the same as immunity from litigation. Lycos won this suit — twice — but how much did these victories cost?)

UPDATE: I had forgotten that the plaintiffs in this case, UCS and its CEO, Michael Zwebner, and their lawyer, John Faro, are no strangers to Overlawyered; they’re the same folks who sued Wolf Blitzer because of posts on Lycos’s message board from an anonymous poster who used the screen name Wolfblitzzer0. (See also updates on March 12, 2005; October 15, 2005).

Filed under: contingent fee, deep pocket