Posts Tagged ‘emotional distress’

Emotional distress from seeing victims in other vehicle

Ronald Miller (Maryland Injury Lawyer Blog) on a case called Jarrett v. Jones: “The Missouri Supreme Court found [July 29] that a truck driver who was in a truck accident with another driver can sue for the emotional damages he suffered when he saw the dead victim in the other car. I’m not sure the decision is legally wrong. But it would not fly in the court of Moral Justice court.” (Aug. 8).

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Seems it’s not considered tortious when it’s done for a good cause by Mothers Against Drunk Driving and the local constabulary to a captive audience of public school students. (Balko, Reason “Hit and Run”; Pat Sherman, “El Camino teens face heavy emotions brought about by drunken-driving dramatization”, San Diego Union-Tribune, May 30). P.S. Scott Greenfield apparently has been thinking along similar lines.

Another thought on Waddah Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada, the fly-in-bottled-water case

The Canadian Supreme Court overturned the lower court C$341,000 decision in Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada, but it’s worth noting that the result would have been different in the United States. To recap, Waddah “Martin” Mustapha saw (but did not consume) a fly in a bottled water. As Yoni Goldstein memorably recounts:

[Mustapha] proceeded to vomit all over his house, and later experienced problems drinking anything with water in it, showering (because that also involves water) and going to work and having sex (where, presumably, water was involved in some major, incapacitating way).

Culligan did not contest that it was negligent; it did not even contest that the sight of the fly caused Mustapha’s injuries. It simply argued that Mustapha’s idiosyncratic reaction was not its concern, and that it should only be liable for the reaction of the reasonable person who had seen a fly in a bottle of water. In the US, that argument does not fly: basic 1L Torts teaches the “eggshell plaintiff” rule–you take the plaintiff as you find him or her. Canada differs. “The law expects reasonable fortitude and robustness of its citizens and will not impose liability for the exceptional frailty of certain individuals.” Canada is thus less prone to the sort of absurd claims that Mustapha raised than the United States is, as, if the courts follow the law, there is less incentive to exaggerate the scope of injury. In a US case, the defendant would have to engage in expensive pre-trial discovery to demonstrate that Mustapha’s psychological disorders were not caused by the incident, and would still have to go to a jury if Mustapha could produce an expert for hire who would testify differently. According to the Canadian Supreme Court, the appropriate approach is to simply use common sense and toss the case. But, as the lower court decision shows, there are certainly some in the judiciary who wish to move the Canadian model closer to the disastrous American one.

Canadian loses bottled-fly-in-water case

Martin Mustapha of Windsor, Ont. had won $340,000 over the fly for emotional distress and phobic reaction, though neither he nor any family member had come in contact with the water in question, since they spotted the insect before opening the bottle. Now the Supreme Court of Canada has refused to disturb an appeals court’s reversal of the award, and has ordered that Mustapha pay the water company’s legal costs. (“SCC quashes man’s suit over fly in bottled water”, CTV, May 22; earlier here and here).

$40 billion demanded over use of newsworthy names on T-shirt

An Arizona antiwar activist has been much criticized for selling a T-shirt with the slogan “Bush Lied, They Died” along with the names of the more than 4,000 U.S. servicemen killed in the war. Parents of a soldier killed in action in Iraq are suing, saying the use of their son’s name has caused them emotional distress; they want class-action status on behalf of all the parents of other soldiers killed in action, amounting to $40 billion. The suit’s Amended Complaint does little to advance the dignity of its cause with assertions like, “Most respectfully, this is a concept that even a mentally-challenged monkey could grasp.” (Howard Wasserman, Prawfsblawg, May 5; Balko, Reason “Hit and Run”, May 6; The Smoking Gun, Apr. 23).

Update: “Lawyer Sanctioned for Suing Over Adversary’s Deposition Questions”

Updating our Jul. 25, 2007 post:

A plaintiffs lawyer who alleged in court that his adversary’s questions at a deposition caused his client emotional distress has been sanctioned for filing a frivolous suit.

New Jersey Superior Court Judge Alfonse Cifelli entered an order March 26, assessing $2,500 in sanctions against Bruce Nagel, of Roseland, N.J.’s Nagel Rice. He must also pay his adversary’s legal fees of $11,630.

However, Cifelli stayed both payments until the Appellate Division rules on a pending appeal of his ruling last October that dismissed Nagel’s suit.

Cifelli, who sits in Newark, had found Nagel failed to state a claim, holding the litigation privilege allowed the adversary, Judith Wahrenberger, to pursue questions she considered relevant without fear of being sued and that the questions were not “extreme or outrageous.”

Nagel says he has received much encouragement from fellow plaintiff’s lawyers for his action; however, any suspension of the usual litigation privilege in favor of personal liability for attorneys would have been very much a double-edged sword, since the asking of emotionally distressing questions during depositions is not exactly a rarity on either side. (Maria Vogel-Short, New Jersey Law Journal, Apr. 9)(link fixed now).

We were counting on you for favorable testimony!

A Utah federal court will consider the Pace family’s lawsuit against California anesthesiologist Barry Swerdlow, whom they had earlier hired as an expert witness as part of their medical liability suit against another anesthesiologist, Stephen Shuput, whom they blamed for their late daughter’s death. After agreeing to come on board as an expert for the Paces, Swerdlow examined Shuput’s deposition and concluded that Shuput had met the standard of care; he proceeded to inform Shuput’s lawyers of this, and they quickly got the case dismissed. The Paces then sued Swerdlow for “malpractice, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligent infliction of emotional distress,” to quote AMNews’s catalogue. Swerdlow conceded that he was new at the expert witness game and that it would probably have been a good idea for him to have read Shuput’s deposition earlier. The EleventhTenth Circuit ruled that a lower court should consider the Paces’s contention that they had suffered legally actionable damages from Swerdlow’s actions. (Bonnie Booth, “Expert who changed mind claims immunity, but plaintiffs still sue”, American Medical News, Apr. 14).

Judge Gorsuch, dissenting from the EleventhTenth Circuit’s ruling, wrote:

Parties already exert substantial influence over expert witnesses, often paying them handsomely for their time, and expert witnesses are, unfortunately and all too frequently, already regarded in some quarters as little more than hired guns. When expert witnesses can be forced to defend themselves in federal court beyond the pleading stage simply for changing their opinions – with no factual allegation to suggest anything other than an honest change in view based on a review of new information – we add fuel to this fire. We make candor an expensive option and risk incenting experts to dissemble rather than change their views in the face of compelling new information. The loser in all this is, of course, the truth-finding function and cause of justice our legal system is designed to serve.

(Decision of the Day, Mar. 5; Karen Franklin, Forensic Psychologist, Mar. 7; The Briefcase, Mar. 7).

“They need to have equal rights”

A snapshot from Massachusetts of the campaign (national in scope) to create rights to sue for intangible damages against veterinarians, motorists, and others judged to have negligently killed a pet. Debra Campanile of Haverhill is on a mission to enact such a law, which, along with provisions for unbounded emotional distress damages, would require punitive damages to be awarded in a sum of at least $2,500. The story does not specify whether the $2,500 would be payable per incident or per actual creature whose life was ended, which could make quite a difference in the case of negligently knocking over Billy’s ant farm. (Laurel J. Sweet, “Push for liability in animal deaths would put….”, Boston Herald, Mar. 10).