Posts Tagged ‘federalism’

Fining the wrong party, criminal edition

We regularly complain about the fact that the legal system is unable — or at least unwilling — to police attorneys who violate the rules. But this failure is not limited to the plaintiff’s bar in civil cases. Lawrence Floyd was a prosecutor in Cuyahoga County who, according to the judge, “deliberately committed prosecutorial misconduct” by making unconstitutional remarks at a murder trial, forcing the judge to declare a mistrial.

His punishment? A $26,000 fine — the amount that a new trial will cost taxpayers. Sounds reasonable, right? Not quite: the judge declined to fine Floyd; instead, she fined taxpayers that amount of money. That’ll show him.

(via Crime & Federalism)

Trial lawyer (this time R) for President?

John Edwards may not be the only plaintiff’s attorney in the White House race:

Mr. Thompson [Sen. Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., much buzzed about as a late-entering Republican possibility] has also been criticized for failing to back some comprehensive tort-reform bills because of his background as a trial lawyer. Here he insists his stance was based on grounds of federalism. “I’m consistent. I address Federalist Society meetings,” he says, noting that more issues should be left to the states. For example, he cast the lonely “nay” in 99-1 votes against a national 0.8% blood alcohol level for drivers, a federal law banning guns in schools, and a measure limiting the tort liability of Good Samaritans. “Washington overreaches, and by doing so ends up not doing well the basics people really care about.” Think Katrina and Walter Reed.

(John Fund, “Lights, Camera . . . Candidacy?”, OpinionJournal.com/WSJ, Mar. 17).

On Sen. Thompson’s behalf, it can be said that he did co-sponsor the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which was enacted into law after he left the Senate. Thus he presumably recognizes that in some situations, federal action can be necessary and proper to prevent a few state courts from imposing their views on the unwilling citizens of distant states. One hopes Thompson also goes so far as to realize that federal curbs on state-court litigation in those circumstances do not necessarily infringe on proper precepts of federalism and decentralization, but in fact can work in defense of them, by protecting the right to self-government of sister states and their citizens. The question is whether he has gone on to consider that quite a few other federal interventions into state-court litigation, in such areas as class actions, product liability and punitive damages, can be defended on very similar grounds (namely, that they are needed to restrain state courts from exporting their legal doctrines to other states) and thus are entirely consistent with “good federalist” precepts.

March 23 roundup

March 14 roundup

Nancy Grace (& lawprofs) on the Duke case

K.C. Johnson has assembled the details (Feb. 19) on the CNN/Court TV commentator’s scurrilous handling of the lacrosse rape allegations. For more on Grace, see Mar. 1, 2006, as well as Legal Blog Watch, May 4, 2005, and Suz at Large, Mar. 2, 2006 (quoting Prof. Bainbridge’s pungent assessment).

The legal professoriate does not escape unscathed from Johnson’s attention, either. He is a particular critic (e.g., Jan. 21) of the televised pronouncements on the case of New England School of Law professor Wendy Murphy. And recent assertions by South Texas College of Law professor Kathleen A. Bergin on the Feminist Law Professors blog (Jan. 29, declaring the players “far from ‘innocent'” whether or not a rape is proven in court) fail to stand up to critical scrutiny, Johnson says (Feb. 18). (More: Cernovich).

P.S. And here’s the Saturday Night Live parody. Plus: Ambrogi, Bainbridge.

“Criminal law comes home”

Something unusual in the Yale Law Journal: an article that takes a not entirely enthusiastic view of the continued spread of domestic restraining orders. Under such orders (some earlier posts) allegations of spousal abuse, whether or not eventually proven at trial and whether or not withdrawn by the accuser, can trigger highly burdensome sanctions against the accused spouse, including a prohibition on entering his or her own home. Harvard Law assistant professor Jeannie Suk says the process can amount to “de facto state-imposed divorce” and greatly increases the power of the state to reach into and reorder family life, sometimes against the will of both parties. (“Criminal Law Comes Home”, Oct., abstract leads to PDF of full version)(via Pattis). In response, a second law professor argues that current legal trends appropriately treat alleged domestic violence as a crime against the state and not just against the nominal victim, and that it is wrong to place too much emphasis on accusers’ supposed right to forgive abusive conduct (Cheryl Hanna, “Because Breaking Up Is Hard To Do”, The Pocket Part, Oct. 12)(& welcome Ron Coleman/Dean Esmay readers).

Driving while loaded

A Nebraska state trooper stopped Emiliano Gomez Gonzolez for speeding on Interstate 80 in 2003 in his rental car, then proceeded to seize $124,000 from a cooler in the back seat. According to the Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals (opinion, PDF), Nebraska was within its rights to seize the $124,000 as presumed drug money (it then became the subject of a federal forfeiture action) even though 1) Gonzolez had no substantial or drug-related criminal record; 2) witnesses backed up his claim that the money had been pooled by several immigrants for purposes of buying a refrigerated truck for his produce business. Gonzolez had initially denied carrying money, and a drug-sniffing dog had detected drug residues in the rental car, though the same would probably prove true of many other rental cars. (“Court rules 2003 money seizure correct despite no drugs found”, AP/Sioux City Journal, Aug. 19; TheNewspaper.com, Aug. 19; libertarian blogs galore including KipEsquire, Radley Balko, Unrepentant Individual). Mike Cernovich (Aug. 21) analyzes what he finds the dubious maneuvers of the Eighth Circuit panel majority in dodging the requirement of deference to the trial court judge’s findings.